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FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS—“SEE YA IN BOSTON,
BRUH”1: MAKING THE LINK BETWEEN THE RIGHT TO
PETITION, ACTIVISM, AND THE MASSACHUSETTS ANTISLAPP STATUTE
Heidi K. Waugh
Conceptual understandings of political engagement in the digital age
continue to evolve as social media and the real-time web reconfigure
the ways in which we exchange information. Despite the increasing
application of e-campaigns, online petitions, and large-scale digital
protests, reciprocity between the governed and the government
continues to endure as the hallmark of representative democracy. The
right to petition, contained within the final clause of the First
Amendment, embodies this central tenet and constitutes the core of the
Massachusetts Anti-SLAPP Statute—legislation that provides a
special motion to dismiss lawsuits designed to chill public
participation in government.
Massachusetts anti-SLAPP jurisprudence is at a critical juncture. As
each special motion to dismiss comes to pass, the courts must grapple
with the statute’s expansive scope and the shifting contours of political
engagement in the twenty-first century. Increasingly, citizens are
engaging in activities that were not originally contemplated by the
statute and seeking protection under the anti-SLAPP paradigm. As
ever more complex scenarios arise, how are courts to determine which
activities meet the statutory definition of petitioning? This Note

* Candidate for J.D., Western New England University School of Law, 2019. Sincere
thanks to Associate Dean Pat Newcombe for her insight, guidance, and understanding
throughout the Note writing process. I would also like to express my gratitude for the Western
New England Law Review staff’s steadfast commitment to getting it right.
1. Barry Meier, Science Consultant Pushes Back Against Unlikely Opponents, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 11, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/12/business/energy-environment/yearsafter-criticism-of-its-practices-science-consultant-pushes-back.html.
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argues that courts must objectively assess a statement’s content,
manner of issuance, and proximity to government action when
determining the scope of petitioning activity. In the absence of an
interpretive framework that is both consistent with the language and
the policies underlying the statute—namely promoting and protecting
an involved citizenry—the judiciary is bound to frustrate, rather than
effectuate, the statute’s legislative intent.

INTRODUCTION
In 1996, Professors Penelope Canan and George W. Pring warned
Americans that a new breed of intimidation litigation was stalking the
nation.2 In their capacity as advocates and scholars, Canan and Pring
observed a proliferation of cases in which citizens were being sued for
circulating petitions, testifying at public hearings, and reporting violations
of law.3 In an effort to draw attention to the dire consequences posed by
such suits—namely, the chilling of public participation—the pair created
the term “strategic lawsuits against public participation” (SLAPPs) in
government.4 Since that time, scholars have characterized the typical
SLAPP scenario as an instance in which a powerful entity files a frivolous
action against an opponent with fewer resources in order to stifle political
activity.5 Often, these meritless lawsuits are either dropped or dismissed.6

2. GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT
1 (1996). In 1996, George W. Pring was a professor of law and Penelope Canan was an associate
professor of sociology at the University of Denver. Id. at cover copy. At that time, Pring and
Canan were also co-directors of the Political Litigation Project at the University of Denver; an
interdisciplinary initiative instituted in 1984 for the purposes of research and education. Id.
Today, Pring is professor of law emeritus at the University of Denver. Faculty & Staff
Directory,
UNIV.
DENVER,
https://www.law.du.edu/faculty-staff/george-pring
[https://perma.cc/UXU2-DVFN]. Canan is professor emerita of the Sociology Department at
the University of Central Florida; she retired from the UCF Sociology Department in December
2012. UCF Sociology, People, UNIV. CENT. FLA., https://sciences.ucf.edu/sociology/
people/canan-penelope/ [https://perma.cc/LJ74-5TNW].
3. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 2–3; see also Citizen Activism Under Attack:
Lawsuits Used to Silence Critics, NEW CITIZEN (1992), http://www.main.nc.us/
cml/new_citizen/TNCv1n1.html#9 [https://perma.cc/A4K5-FM8W] (recounting examples of
citizens being sued for petitioning against development projects in their communities).
4. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 3.
5. Rebecca Ariel Hoffberg, The Special Motion Requirements of the Massachusetts AntiSLAPP Statute: A Real Slap in the Face for Traditional Civil Practice and Procedure, 16 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 97, 97 (2006); see Richard J. Yurko & Shannon C. Choy, Reconciling the AntiSLAPP Statute with Abuse of Process and Other Litigation-Based Torts, 51 BOS. B.J. 15, 15–
16 (2007).
6. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 1. Although early SLAPPs rarely prevailed in court,
mounting a successful defense consumed a substantial amount of time. Id. at 218. Pring and
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But the underlying purpose of the action—deterring citizens from freely
engaging in government by imposing the costly and stressful burdens of
litigation—is often achieved.7
Because SLAPPs target “the right of the people . . . to petition the
government for a redress of grievances,”8 the lawsuits’ negative
implications arguably affect all citizens.9 As Canan and Pring explained:
The ominous new risk for those who express their views to the
government is that opponents—not content with rebuttal in the same
public forums—will drag citizens out of the political arena and into
the courthouse with staggering personal lawsuits. The “chilling”
effect [of] this new breed of cases on public debate and citizen
involvement is already significant; the possible effect on the future of
our society and its public-participatory form of government is even
more threatening.10

In recognition of this threat, and in an effort to preserve a core feature
of the democratic process, over thirty states—including Massachusetts—
have enacted anti-SLAPP statutes.11 Anti-SLAPP statutes target lawsuits
that are intended to chill a party’s exercise of its right to petition by
Canan found that on average, the lawsuits lasted forty months. Id. Some suits, however,
endured for as long as thirteen years. Id.
7. See id. at 3 (“[W]e conservatively estimate that thousands have been sued into silence,
and that more thousands who heard of the SLAPPs will never again participate freely and
confidently in the public issues and governance of their town, state, or country.”); see also What
is a SLAPP Suit?, ACLU OHIO, https://www.acluohio.org/slapped/what-is-a-slapp-suit
[https://perma.cc/S2UL-P42Q] (“In addition to engendering fear and intimidation, the party
initiating the suit (SLAPPOR) often seeks to bleed the other party (SLAPPEE) of resources and
produce a chilling effect . . . .”).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 2.
10. Id.
11. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-752 (2018); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-63-504 (2018); CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8136 (2018); D.C. CODE
§ 16-5502 (2018); FLA. STAT. § 768.295 (2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1 (2018); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 634F-2(9) (2018); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/15 (2018); IND. CODE §§ 34-7-7-1
to 34-7-7-10 (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5320 (2018); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 971
(2018); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2018); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5807 (West 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (2018); MINN. STAT. § 554.02 (2018); MO.
ANN. STAT. § 537.528 (West 2018); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-21 (West 2018); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 41.635–670 (West 2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1 (West 2018); N.Y. CIV.
RIGHTS LAW § 70-a (McKinney 2018); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1430–38 (West 2018); OR.
REV. STAT. § 31.150 (2018); 27 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8302 (2018); 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-33-2
(2018); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-1003 (2018); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.003
(West 2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-1403 (West 2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1041
(2018); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-223.2 (2018); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.510 (2018); 7 GUAM
CODE ANN. § 17104 (2018).
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creating a special motion to dismiss that the targeted party may file prior
to any discovery.12 Although the text of the statutes vary from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction, all anti-SLAPP legislation recognizes that “the single
element of reaction to political action . . . distinguishes SLAPPs from the
everyday retaliatory lawsuit[].”13 Therefore, in determining whether a
lawsuit is in fact a SLAPP, and whether a statement is entitled to immunity
under anti-SLAPP legislation, courts must frequently decide whether the
party seeking protection exercised their constitutional right to petition the
government.14
Enter Cherri Foytlin and Karen Savage: environmental activists who
penned and published an article on the Huffington Post’s Green Blog in
October of 2013.15 The blog post, titled ChemRisk, BP and Purple
Strategies: A Tangled Web of Not-So-Independent Science,16 concerned a
specific study that ChemRisk, a scientific consulting company, conducted
and released on behalf of British Petroleum (BP) following the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill.17 In furtherance of the study, ChemRisk considered “the
extent to which [off-shore] cleanup workers responding to the Deepwater
Horizon spill had been exposed to the [airborne] chemicals benzene,
toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylene (collectively known as BTEX).”18
Whereas the final report indicates that cleanup workers endured levels of
exposure “well below the Permissible Exposure Limits (PELs) established
by the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).”19

12. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (2018).
13. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 8.
14. Id.; see also Jeffrey J. Pyle, Cardno ChemRisk v. Foytlin: Supreme Judicial Court
Holds That Anti-SLAPP Law Protects Opinion Writing, BOS. B.J. (May 11, 2017),
https://bostonbarjournal.com/2017/05/11/cardno-chemrisk-v-foytlin-supreme-judicial-courtholds-that-anti-slapp-law-protects-opinion-writing/
[https://perma.cc/7M7N-YVHW]
(contending that special motions to dismiss under anti-SLAPP statutes “are typically won or
lost on the question of whether [the activity] . . . is ‘petitioning.’”).
15. Cardno ChemRisk, LLC v. Foytlin, 68 N.E.3d 1180, 1184 (Mass. 2017); see Meier,
supra note 1.
16. Cherri Foytlin & Karen Savage, ChemRisk, BP and Purple Strategies: A Tangled Web
of Not-So-Independent Science, HUFFPOST (Oct. 14, 2013, 12:29 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/chemrisk-bp-and-purple-st_b_4095131.html
[https://perma.cc/9C2E-56GX].
17. Cardno ChemRisk, LLC, 68 N.E.3d at 1183. The oil spill occurred on April 20, 2010.
Id. The explosion of Deepwater Horizon, a BP oil rig, resulted in “approximately 4.9 million
barrels of oil . . . flow[ing] into the Gulf of Mexico, some forty miles off the coast of Louisiana.”
Id.
18. Id. at 1184; Foytlin & Savage, supra note 16.
19. ChemRisk LLC, Study by Leading Scientific Consulting Firm Finds No Evidence of
Health Dangers for Gulf Coast Cleanup Workers, CISION (Sept. 2, 2011, 4:04 PM),
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Foytlin and Savage suggest that ChemRisk’s “science” is a product of
“truth-for-hire” that fails to tell the whole story.20
In the blog post, Foytlin and Savage initially contextualize their
skepticism of ChemRisk’s BTEX report against the backdrop of litigation
then-ongoing in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana.21 According to the authors, the trial bore witness to a
“scientific battle” between the Department of Justice (DOJ) and BP
experts over the amount of oil that escaped in 2010.22 The blog continues
by stating:
As [the DOJ] alluded [at trial], BP does not exactly have a
reputation for coming clean on the facts surrounding the disaster.
Early on, the oil giant told the public that the leak was an estimated
5,000 barrels per day, yet according [to] the company’s own internal
emails BP knew that up to 100,000 barrels per day were flowing
unchecked into the Gulf of Mexico ecosystem.
BP has consistently used their “science” to low-ball the amount
of the spill and minimize its impacts on Gulf Coast residents and
ecosystems.
Additionally, contracted clean-up workers[,] who continue to
struggle daily with serious health concerns brought on by their
exposure to BP’s toxic crude and the oil dispersant Corexit, have often
hit a wall of BP’s “independent” data.23

The authors then introduce the ChemRisk BTEX report as an example
of BP’s failure to “come clean” on the facts—an instance in which the
company “tout[ed] industry-friendly scien[ce] to cloud the truth.”24
Following several passages concerning the report’s findings, the blog’s
investigatory gaze shifts from BP’s tactics of mitigation to ChemRisk’s
history of “truth-clouding.”25

https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/study-by-leading-scientific-consulting-firm-findsno-evidence-of-health-dangers-for-gulf-coast-cleanup-workers-129139328.html.
20. See Foytlin & Savage, supra note 16.
21. Cardno ChemRisk, LLC, 68 N.E.3d at 1184; see also In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig
“Deepwater Horizon” in Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 900–03 (E.D.
La. 2012).
22. Foytlin & Savage, supra note 16.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. (referencing public relations firms’ practice of disseminating “industry-friendly
scien[ce] to cloud the truth”).
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As it turns out, ChemRisk has a long, and on at least one occasion
fraudulent, history of defending big polluters, using questionable
ethics to help their clients avoid legal responsibility for their actions.
One well-known example is the case that became the basis for
the movie Erin Brockovich, where the polluter and defendant Pacific
Gas and Electric (PG & E) was found to have paid ChemRisk to
discredit research done by Chinese scientist Dr. Jian Dong Zhang.26

Ultimately, the blog closes with a claim and stark comparison: while
public relations firms continue to work tirelessly to minimize BP’s
liability for the Deepwater Horizon oil explosion, residents of the Gulf
Coast are left to wonder if anyone will ever “make it right.”27
Following the blog’s publication on Huffington Post, a ChemRisk
representative requested its retraction.28 Upon learning of the request,
Foytlin posted the blog on her Facebook page and told ChemRisk, “kiss
my derriere.”29 Foytlin informed the Huffington Post editor that she
believed the blog’s content was factually accurate; thereafter, the piece
remained posted on the website.30 In response, ChemRisk filed suit for
defamation in both New York and Massachusetts.31 The authors, initially
appearing pro se, successfully filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction in the New York state court.32 With respect to the
suit filed in Massachusetts, Foytlin once again took to Facebook: “‘That’s
cool fellas,’ . . . . ‘We’re up for Round Two. Bring it, but you betta go tell
ya Daddy that people with nothing to lose rarely do. See ya in Boston,
Bruh.’”33
Thereafter, in August 2015, Foytlin and Savage filed a special motion
to dismiss under Massachusetts’ anti-SLAPP statute.34 Despite “asserting
that the claim against them was based solely on their exercise of the right

26. Id. The blog post explains that Dr. Zhang had conducted research on chromium-6—
a chemical compound found in Hinkley, California’s drinking water supply. Id. Dr. Zhang
unearthed strong connections between chromium-6 and cancer. Id. The authors of the blog
contend that “ChemRisk obtained Dr. Zhang’s data, and without his knowledge, intentionally
manipulated the findings to contradict his own earlier studies. The erroneous data was then
submitted to the Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine (JOEM) as though it
had been re-worked by Dr. Zhang personally.” Id.
27. Id.
28. Meier, supra note 1.
29. Id.; see also Cardno ChemRisk, LLC v. Foytlin, 68 N.E.3d 1180, 1185 (Mass. 2017).
30. Cardno ChemRisk, LLC, 68 N.E.3d at 1185.
31. Id.
32. Id.; see also Meier, supra note 1.
33. Meier, supra note 1.
34. Cardno ChemRisk, LLC, 68 N.E.3d at 1185.
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to petition, that they had a reasonable factual basis for their statements,
and that they caused no injury[,]” the Massachusetts Superior Court
denied the motion.35 The judge determined that the defendants were not
engaged in petitioning activity.36 In response, the defendants filed an
interlocutory appeal and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC)
granted direct appellate review.37 Several months later, with the final
decision pending, the New York Times reported that Foytlin and Savage
seemed “unfazed.”38 In Savage’s opinion, the blog would have “slipped
off into obscurity” but for ChemRisk’s defamation suit.39 In addition to
drawing attention to the blog, the lawsuit “highlight[ed] how the Internet
has blurred the line between activists and journalists”40 and created an
opportunity for the SJC to draw a distinction between petitioning and nonpetitioning activity under the anti-SLAPP statute.
On direct appellate review, the SJC found that the blog post qualified
as petitioning activity.41 Although the court extensively analyzed whether
the blog writers had exercised their own right to petition, it provided scarce
reasoning with regard to the manner in which the blog post itself met the

35. Id.
36. Cardno ChemRisk, LLC v. Foytlin, No. 2014-3932, 2015 WL 13016335, at *1 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Oct. 23, 2015), rev’d, 68 N.E.3d 1180 (Mass. 2017). In denying the special motion,
Judge Edward P. Leibensperger compared the conduct of Foytlin and Savage to that of the
defendant in Fustolo v. Hollander, 920 N.E.2d 837, 838–40 (Mass. 2010). Id. Of note, in
Fustolo, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the denial of a journalist’s antiSLAPP special motion to dismiss because the statements at issue—newspaper articles Hollander
penned pertaining to real estate development—did not constitute the seeking of redress for a
grievance of her own. See Fustolo, 920 N.E.2d at 842–43. In short, in Cardno ChemRisk, LLC,
Judge Leibensperger determined that Foytlin and Savage were not petitioning the government
to redress a grievance of their own. Cardno ChemRisk, LLC, 2015 WL 13016335, at *1. See
generally Kobrin v. Gastfriend, 821 N.E.2d 60, 68 n.14 (Mass. 2005) (“[O]ur only concern, as
required by the statute, is that the person be truly ‘petitioning’ the government in the
constitutional sense.”).
37. Cardno ChemRisk, LLC, 68 N.E.3d at 1185.
38. Meier, supra note 1.
39. Id. Savage informed The New York Times “that the article was initially read by only
400 people.” Id.
40. Id.; see also Noor Tagouri, Blurred Lines: Journalism or Activism?, HUFFPOST
(Sept. 2, 2014, 4:18 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/noor-tagouri-/blurred-linesjournalism-or-activism_b_5742944.html [https://perma.cc/ZY7A-UBSD]; cf. Patrick Butler,
How to Define the Line Between Journalism and Activism in the Digital Age, INT’L CTR. FOR
JOURNALISTS (May 2, 2016), https://www.icfj.org/blogs/how-define-line-between-journalismand-activism-digital-age [https://perma.cc/YQY8-DDAB] (reporting on discussions held at the
International Symposium on Online Journalism regarding methods for distinguishing activism
from journalism).
41. Cardno ChemRisk, LLC, 68 N.E.3d at 1183.

6 - WAUGH.PUBLISHER READY. 2.18.2019 (DO NOT DELETE)

148

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

2/19/2019 8:34 PM

[Vol. 41:141

statute’s definition of the right to petition.42 Nonetheless, civil rights
activists lauded the decision as a triumph in an era in which the right to
speak out must be protected.43 The decision came, however, merely weeks
after the Economist Intelligence Unit reported that the United States had
fallen from a full democracy to a flawed democracy because of its high
levels of distrust of government and low levels of political participation.44
In juxtaposition, the Cardno ChemRisk decision and the Economist
Intelligence Unit report highlight an inconvenient truth: we are living in
an era in which the right to petition must be realized before it can be
protected. Without question, low levels of civic engagement threaten the
future of democracy,45 but what are the consequences of classifying
activities with attenuated ties to government action as political
participation? The value at stake—“a government ‘by the people, for the
people, and of the people’”—remains the same.46 The threat to that value,
however, becomes compounded when the importance of the connection
between public participation and engagement with the government is
overlooked.47

42. See id. at 1187–88. Although this Note does not focus on the debate pertaining to
whether or not the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute requires special movants to have
petitioned in their own right—that is, petitioned for the redress of their own grievances—others
have broached the topic. See David Kluft, Blogger-Journalist Protected from Defamation Suit
by Anti-SLAPP Statute, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. (Feb. 28, 2017),
http://www.trademarkandcopyrightlawblog.com/2017/02/blogger-journalist-protected-fromdefamation-suit-by-anti-slapp-statute/ [https://perma.cc/6KYD-3UFM] (reconciling the
seemingly divergent opinions in Massachusetts’ anti-SLAPP jurisprudence on the matter of
petitioning in one’s own right); see also Vince Pisegna & Tony Cichello, Blog Posts by
Environmental Activists Protected by Massachusetts “Anti-SLAPP” Statute, LITIGATORS’
BLOG (Feb. 28, 2017), http://kb-law.com/blog/?p=410 (discussing the distinction between
persons seeking redress on their own behalf and individuals who engage in petitioning activity,
but not within their own right—such as hired consultants and paid experts).
43. John R. Ellement, SJC Rules in Favor of Environmental Activists Who Questioned
Part of Deepwater Horizon Cleanup, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 14, 2017),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/02/14/sjc-rules-for-environmental-activists-whoquestioned-part-deepwater-horizon-cleanup/uRUC8hmy0bfyZSQW2h8QmO/story.html
[https://perma.cc/H43E-PE8D].
44. See DEMOCRACY INDEX 2016: REVENGE OF THE “DEPLORABLES”, ECONOMIST
INTELLIGENCE UNIT 24 (2017), http://felipesahagun.es/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/
Democracy-Index-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FMC-DSQM] [hereinafter DEMOCRACY
INDEX]; see also Amanda Erickson, The U.S. is No Longer a ‘Full Democracy,’ a New Study
Warns, WASH. POST (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/
wp/2017/01/26/america-is-no-longer-a-full-democracy-a-new-study-warns.
45. See DEMOCRACY INDEX, supra note 44.
46. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 8.
47. See RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., RECLAIMING THE PETITION CLAUSE 153–55
(2012) (framing representative democracy as a “collaborative enterprise”). “The ability to
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This Note contends that through its decision in Cardno ChemRisk,
LLC v. Foytlin, the court revealed a paradox: the potential for judicial
interpretation of the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute to obscure the
statute’s underlying policy objective of promoting and protecting an
involved citizenry.48 Part I begins by surveying the emergence of
SLAPPs, the historical development of the First Amendment’s Petition
Clause, and the SJC’s early SLAPP jurisprudence. Part II discusses the
enactment of the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute and traces its
trajectory, focusing specifically on the method of statutory interpretation
undertaken by the courts.
Part III examines the judicial construction of the definition of the right
to petition under the anti-SLAPP statute and demonstrates the ways in
which courts have invoked objective, conduct-focused standards in order
to preserve the statute’s legislative intent. Part IV of this Note explores
the court’s result-oriented approach in Cardno ChemRisk, LLC v.
Foytlin.49 Part V demonstrates the court’s deviation from existing antiSLAPP jurisprudence and details the manner in which the court’s analysis
obscures the statute’s underlying policy objectives. In an effort to
reconcile the statute’s language and legislative intent, Part V introduces
alternative interpretive frameworks used in other jurisdictions to
determine the scope of petitioning activity.
Ultimately, this Note argues that in construing the definition of the
right to petition, the SJC should objectively assess a statement’s content,
manner of issuance, and proximity to government action. In the absence
of an interpretive framework that is consistent with both the language and
the policies underlying the statute—namely promoting and protecting an
involved citizenry—the judiciary is bound to frustrate, rather than
effectuate, the statute’s legislative intent.
I.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERPINNINGS OF ANTI-SLAPP
LEGISLATION AND INTERPRETATION

SLAPPs are normally disguised as legitimate cases worthy of
remedy.50 Most often, filers of such suits attempt to conceal the essence
of the dispute by characterizing their claim as a defamation suit, an

access and engage government, in a meaningful way, remains central to the success of the
project of democratic self-government.” Id. at 153.
48. See Cardno ChemRisk, LLC v. Foytlin, 68 N.E.3d 1180, 1186 (Mass. 2017).
49. Id. at 1187–88.
50. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 150.
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antitrust action, or an abuse-of-process claim.51 Despite this variation,
SLAPPs are uniformly “triggered by defendants’ attempts to influence
government action—the exact activity covered by the Petition Clause of
the First Amendment.”52 The narrative below details the development of
the First Amendment’s right to petition and traces the trajectory of the
Supreme Court’s Petition Clause jurisprudence.
A. The First Amendment Right to Petition
The Petition Clause concludes the First Amendment’s earnest
enumeration of expressive rights, and safeguards a foundational American
liberty.53 In pertinent part, the First Amendment provides that “Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people . . . to petition
the government for a redress of grievances.”54 Although the First
Amendment established a number of rights, such as the freedom of speech
and the right to assemble, the Petition Clause “enshrined as a right[,] a
pre-existing and formalized system of petitioning for public and private
grievances.”55 In an effort to distinguish the right to petition from other
First Amendment rights, scholars have noted the early origins of
petitioning.56
In the years preceding the American Revolution, colonists understood
the right to petition as “an affirmative, remedial [practice] which required
governmental hearing and response.”57 Moreover, throughout the colonial
51. Id.
52. Id. at 3.
53. Catherine Phillips, Note, The Lost Democratic Institution of Petitioning: Public
Employee Collective Bargaining as a Constitutional Right, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 652, 671–
72 (2012).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
55. Phillips, supra note 53, at 672 (emphasis omitted).
56. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 15 (“[Notably], the right to petition is far older
than its better-known cousins. . . . It appears in the earliest English laws of more than 1,000
years ago.”); see also Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The History and
Significance of the Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2153, 2163 (1998) (“The practice of
petitioning the King for redress long antedated [the] Magna Carta.”). Although the practice of
petitioning precedes formal English law, the right of certain nobles to petition the king was first
recognized in the Magna Carta. David Bernstein, Freedom of Assembly and Petition, HERITAGE
GUIDE TO THE CONST., https://www.heritage.org/constitution/#!/amendments/1/essays/
141/freedom-of-assembly-and-petition [https://perma.cc/D2BH-K5W7]. Thereafter, in 1669,
Parliament extended the right to petition to all British subjects. Id. Petitions were essentially
the public’s sole means of communicating with the government, and as such, the right to petition
boasts “a long-standing Anglo-American pedigree as a right independent of general free speech
and press rights.” Id.
57. Stephen A. Higginson, Note, A Short History of the Right to Petition Government for
the Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142, 142 (1986); accord Mark, supra note 56, at 2160–
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and post-colonial eras, petitioning was held as a central tenet of
representative democracy because the practice served as a means for
citizens to not only communicate their concerns to elected officials, but
also to obtain governmental relief.58 The precise language of the
Declaration of Independence demonstrates the fundamental nature of
petitioning as a democratic practice necessitated by the notion of a
government “of the people, by the people, and for the people.”59 The
Declaration states, “[i]n every stage of these Oppressions We have
Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms: Our repeated Petitions
have been answered only by repeated injury.”60 Here, the particular
phrasing succinctly illustrates that petitioning was initially understood as
an affirmative process in which a request for government assistance
received a hearing and governmental response.61
In the years following the American Revolution, the practice of
petitioning the government for a redress of grievances was implicit in the
very notion of the new nation.62 At the time of the Constitution’s drafting,
there was an expectation that petitioning, as a process, would continue and
encompass “political receptiveness to public concern[].”63 It follows,
therefore, that the primary focus of the founders’ debate was not whether
petitioning itself was a right.64 Rather, the founders sought to determine
whether petitioning should include a right of the people to instruct the

62. Upon adoption of the Massachusetts Body of Liberties in 1642, Massachusetts became one
of the first colonies—if not the first—to explicitly safeguard the right to petition and codify its
remedial function. Compare Bernstein, supra note 56 (contending that the Massachusetts Body
of Liberties was the first colonial charter to explicitly protect the right to petition), with Mark,
supra note 56, at 2177 (“Massachusetts was among the first colonies explicitly to affirm the
right [to petition].”).
58. Phillips, supra note 53, at 672–73; cf. Bernstein, supra note 56 (noting that colonial
assemblies did not grant every petition but answered every petition in an effort to keep with the
English tradition of responding to legitimate prayers for relief).
59. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 8.
60. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 30 (U.S. 1776).
61. See Phillips, supra note 53, at 674 (relating the Declaration of Independence’s “long
list of grievances” to the notion of petitioning as a process of hearing and response); see also
Higginson, supra note 57, at 155 (“That the Framers meant to imply a corresponding
governmental duty of a fair hearing seems clear given the history of petitioning in the colonies
and the colonists’ outrage at England’s refusal to listen to their grievances.”).
62. See, e.g., McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482–83 (1985) (discussing the extensive
history of the Petition Clause and its fundamental role in the Declaration of Rights enacted by
state conventions); see also Mark, supra note 56, at 2191.
63. Adam Newton, Freedom of Petition Overview, FREEDOM F. INST. (Oct. 10, 2002),
https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/first-amendment-center/topics/freedom-of-petition/
freedom-of-petition-overview/ [https://perma.cc/TL4E-YATG].
64. Phillips, supra note 53, at 674.
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government.65
Significantly, debates at the time “centered on
understandings of representative democracy and the relationship between
citizens and their representatives.”66 The connection between public
participation and government—the very essence of the right to petition—
was implicitly assumed as an element bound for preservation as a right
under the new nation.67 The historical record, therefore, indicates that “the
right of the people . . . to petition the government for a redress of
grievances”68 was designed to assure a particular freedom of expression—
one that reveres the relationship between public participation and
government as a hallmark of American political life.69
Today, conceptual understandings of the Petition Clause are at once
expansive and limited in scope.70 In general terms, the right to petition is
considered to protect “any peaceful, legal attempt to promote or
discourage government action at any level (federal, state, or local) and in
any branch (legislative, executive, judicial, and the electorate).”71 An
activity need not consist of the literal filing of a petition in order to
constitute an exercise of the right to petition, but citizens must engage in
an activity that stands as a means of expressing their views to
government.72 While the definition of the right has been extended beyond
its literal text, knowledge of the right itself—and of its vital role in

65. Mark, supra note 56, at 2206–07. Specifically, the founders considered investing
citizens with the power to tell elected representatives how to redress particular grievances and
subsequently bind the representatives to the prescribed method. See Phillips, supra note 53, at
675.
66. Phillips, supra note 53, at 675.
67. Mark, supra note 56, at 2191–92. The “near universal acceptance of petitioning” in
the colonial era created a sense of resolve among colonists: “[P]etitioning [became] a
constitutional right because people thought it was one and defended it as one.” Id. at 2191.
“Given the English and colonial heritage . . . it is unsurprising to find the right to petition
unequivocally claimed by the people in the earliest state constitutions.” Id. at 2195.
68. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
69. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 15.
70. See, e.g., Mark, supra note 56, at 2155 n.2 (discussing the manner in which the Petition
Clause has become “peripheral . . . to mainstream constitutional discourse”).
71. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 16 (footnote omitted).
72. See id. (“Protected activities include . . . filing complaints, reporting violations of law,
testifying before government bodies, writing letters, lobbying legislatures, advocating before
administrative agencies, circulating petitions, conducting initiative and referendum
campaigns . . . filing lawsuits. . . . [P]eaceful demonstrations, protests, picketing, and boycotts
aimed at producing government action.”).

6 - WAUGH.PUBLISHER READY. 2.18.2019(DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

“SEE YA IN BOSTON, BRUH”

2/19/2019 8:34 PM

153

affecting government action—constitutes a small fraction of the American
public’s political consciousness.73
The vast array of protected petitioning activities arguably mirrors the
Petition Clause’s magnitude as “one of the ‘fundamental principles of
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and political
institutions.’”74 Legal scholars, however, contend that the Petition Clause
has fallen into desuetude; the right to petition no longer serves as the
critical bond between the government and the governed.75 Despite
Americans’ renowned attachment to the right to speak out, only three
percent of Americans are aware that the First Amendment includes the
Petition Clause.76 Unlike the First Amendment’s guarantees of freedom
of speech, press, and religion, the right to petition is seldom addressed by
scholars and scarcely covered in law school curriculums. 77 Whereas the
Petition Clause “recognizes that the ‘word of the represented’ . . . is a vital
part of controlling the way government affects [Americans’] lives,” the
“represented” largely fail to recognize that the Petition Clause provides
the connective tissue that maintains the relationship between citizens and
government.78
Although Americans are largely unaware of the Petition Clause,79
they operate under a number of assumptions reflecting its underlying

73. See, e.g., Doh! Americans Know ‘The Simpsons’ Better Than First Amendment, LIVE
SCI. (Mar. 1, 2006 5:48 AM), https://www.livescience.com/7069-doh-americans-simpsonsamendment.html [https://perma.cc/FDZ7-U7CN].
74. Id. (quoting De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937)).
75. David J. Shestokas, US Constitution’s First Amendment: Right to Petition for Redress
of Grievances, DAVID J. SHESTOKAS (July 1, 2013), http://www.shestokas.com/constitutioneducational-series/us-constitutions-first-amendment-right-to-petition-for-redress-ofgrievances/ [https://perma.cc/5M8W-QWHG] (“The Right to Petition is unknown to most
Americans, or if known, considered to be an extension of the first four rights, and not a right
that stands on its own.”); see also Mark, supra note 56, at 2155 (“To say that the right is today
moribund is grossly to understate the case.”).
76. 2017 ANNENBERG CONSTITUTION DAY CIVICS SURVEY, ANNENBERG PUB. POL’Y
CTR.
(2017),
https://cdn.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/
Appendix_Civics_survey_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4VZ-YMP8] [hereinafter CIVICS
SURVEY].
77. KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 47, at 81 (noting the Petition Clause’s “relative obscurity”
to contemporary practitioners and legal scholars); PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 18.
78. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 16; see also The Associated Press, We Know
‘Simpsons’ Better Than Freedoms, QUAD-CITY TIMES (Mar. 1, 2006), https://qctimes.com/
news/local/we-know-simpsons-better-than-freedoms/article_f7e3d53a-ec21-5c55-aa608987d44b2bdd.html [hereinafter We Know ‘Simpsons’] (discussing Americans’ misconceptions
and misidentification of First Amendment rights).
79. The 2015 State of The First Amendment, FREEDOM F. INST. 2 (2015),
https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/FAC_SOFA15_
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policies.80 Americans, for instance, presume that they can speak out.81
They also assume that the political system that encourages them to do so
will protect them.82 A number of Americans believe the right to speak out
is absolute.83
Although the clause itself validates Americans’
presumptions pertaining to the existence of the right, the judicial system’s
interpretation of the clause disproves their presumptions pertaining to the
extent of protection it affords.84
B. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Petition Clause
Although the Supreme Court’s Petition Clause jurisprudence is
neither robust nor extensive,85 the Court has consistently held that the right
to petition does not constitute an absolute immunity for communications
made to the government.86 In its initial consideration of the Petition
Clause, the Court recognized the critical relationship between the exercise
of the right to petition and the productive operation of government.87 Over
the course of the twentieth century, the Court reiterated its earlier

report.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9G5-KMCY] (reporting that only two percent of American adults
sampled were familiar with the right to petition); We Know ‘Simpsons’, supra note 78
(discussing findings that one percent of Americans are aware of the right to petition); CIVICS
SURVEY, supra note 76, at 2 (finding that only three percent of respondents knew of the First
Amendment’s Petition Clause).
80. See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 47, at 81.
81. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 2; see also Barack Obama (@barackobama),
FACEBOOK
(Sept.
5,
2017),
https://www.facebook.com/barackobama/posts/
10155227588436749 [https://perma.cc/K4JB-PB56] (“What makes us American is our fidelity
to a set of ideals . . . that all of us share an obligation to stand up, speak out, and secure our most
cherished values for the next generation.”).
82. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 2; see also J. Gerald Herbert, Symposium: The Right
to Vote in Peace, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 23, 2018, 3:13 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2018/01/symposium-right-vote-peace/ [https://perma.cc/NLJ5-3S6N] (“The First Amendment
protects every American’s right to speak out on contentious issues . . . .”). But see Amanda A.
Konarski, Comment, The Reporter’s Privilege is Essential to Checks and Balances Being
Accessible to the American Electorate, 11 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 258, 275 (2014) (contending
that the American government vehemently pursues legal action against those who “speak out”
about questionable governmental practices).
83. See Emily Swanson, Nearly Half of Americans Grasp the First Amendment About as
Well as Sarah Palin Does, HUFFPOST (Jan. 15, 2014, 4:33 PM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/15/first-amendment-poll_n_4603896.html
[https://perma.cc/2PWY-3FVZ].
84. See, e.g., McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 483 (1985).
85. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 18.
86. See, e.g., McDonald, 472 U.S. at 483.
87. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875) (“The very idea of a
government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for
consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances.”).
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sentiments, but indicated with clarity that the Petition Clause does not
afford an absolute privilege despite its “assurance of a particular freedom
of expression.”88 For instance, in McDonald v. Smith, the Court reasoned
that “[a]lthough the values in the right of petition as an important aspect
of self-government are beyond question, it does not follow that the
Framers of the First Amendment believed that the Petition Clause
provided absolute immunity.”89 The Court declined to “elevate the
Petition Clause to special First Amendment status” by deviating from its
dedicated course of interpreting the Petition Clause as the conference of a
qualified privilege.90
Despite the Supreme Court’s consistent characterization of the right
to petition as a qualified immunity, the Court has wavered in its
articulation of the qualification.91 Quite similarly, in the latter half of the
twentieth century, federal and state courts were unable to “agree on a
single, clear-cut standard for petitioning activity that [was] ‘over the line’
and unworthy of protection.”92 In interpreting the right to petition, courts
often invoked ill-defined tests that necessitated a subjective inquiry into
the petitioner’s mental state.93 While some judges “refused to protect
[petitioners] whose government petitioning was done out of ‘malice,’”
others deemed petitioning done with an intent to harass as an unqualified
activity.94
In 1991, however, the Court articulated an objective standard for
determining whether an activity warranted immunity under the Petition
Clause, and created the potential for more consistent applications of the
immunity assured by the right to petition.95 Although the objective
standard originated from a line of antitrust litigation involving the
Sherman Antitrust Act,96 courts have applied the standard in a number of
88. McDonald, 472 U.S. at 482–83.
89. Id. at 483.
90. Id. at 485.
91. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 19.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 (1991).
96. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018). Congress passed its first antitrust law, The Sherman
Antitrust Act, in 1890. The Antitrust Laws, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competitionguidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/MM2V-XP25]. Enacted with
the purpose of preserving free competition in trade, the Act prohibits unreasonable restraints on
trade and monopolization. Id. See generally Jenny Pacquette, Old is Not Always Wise: The
Inapplicability of the Sherman Act in the Age of the Internet, 89 TEMP. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 13–
21 (2017) (discussing the purpose of the Sherman Antitrust Act and its judicial trajectory).
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cases involving petitioning activities.97 The case law, briefly surveyed
below, upholds significant First Amendment principles pertaining to the
right to petition and provides instructive guidance regarding the manner
in which immunity under the Petition Clause should be granted.98
1.

The Sham Exception

In 1957, forty-one long-distance trucking operators commenced an
action in the United States District Court of Pennsylvania against twentyfour major railroads for alleged violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act.99
The operators claimed that the railroads conducted an intentionally
injurious public relations campaign in an effort to suppress deregulation
of the trucking industry.100 Whereas the district court found in favor of
the trucking operators, the Supreme Court held that the Petition Clause
immunized the activities of the railroads “at least insofar as those activities
comprised mere solicitation of governmental action with respect to the
passage and enforcement of laws.”101 The Court reasoned:
In a representative democracy such as this, these branches of
government act on behalf of the people and, to a very large extent, the
whole concept of representation depends upon the ability of the people
to make their wishes known to their representatives. To hold that the
government retains the power to act in this representative capacity and
yet hold, at the same time, that the people cannot freely inform the
government of their wishes would impute to the Sherman Act a
purpose to regulate, not business activity, but political activity, a
purpose which would have no basis whatever in the legislative history
of that Act.102

Although the Court advanced an expansive articulation of the right to
petition, it refused to construe the privilege as an absolute immunity. 103
Rather, the Court acknowledged that situations may arise in which

97. See Kathleen L. Daerr-Bannon, Causes of Action: Bringing and Defending AntiSLAPP Motions to Strike or Dismiss, 22 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 317, § 4 (2003) (“[L]ower
courts have not been reluctant at all to apply the principles enunciated beyond the antitrust arena,
and it is generally accepted that these holdings are broadly applied.”).
98. See Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. at 365; United Mine Workers of Am. v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 660 (1965); E.R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 128 (1961).
99. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. at 128–29.
100. Id. at 129–30.
101. Id. at 138.
102. Id. at 137.
103. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 24.
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publicity campaigns—seemingly designed to influence governmental
action—are “mere shams” to cloak actual attempts to interfere with the
operations of business competitors.104 In such an instance, application of
the Sherman Antitrust Act would be justified, despite countervailing
constitutional considerations.105
2.

The Rise of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine

In United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, the Supreme
Court further developed the principle put forth in Noerr and thereby
established what has become known as the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine.106
In Pennington, small coal mine operators initiated an antitrust action
against the coal miners’ union for allegedly conspiring with large coal
companies to force small miners out of business.107 Operators argued that
the union and large companies jointly—and successfully—petitioned the
Secretary of Labor to increase minimum wage beyond the point that
operators could afford for the purpose of driving them out of the
competitive market.108
The Court extended immunity to the activities of the coal miners’
union in holding that “a concerted genuine effort to influence public
officials is shielded from the Sherman Act ‘regardless of intent or purpose.
Joint efforts to influence public officials do not violate antitrust laws even
though intended to eliminate competition.’”109 Although the Court did not
expressly include a discussion of the “sham exception,” its analysis makes
clear that “[i]t is not the intent [of the conduct] that counts.”110 Rather, the
determinative “issue is whether efforts to influence government officials
[are] genuine.”111
3.

Outcome over Process: The Omni Standard

In City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc.,112 the Court
illustrated the importance of evaluating conduct—rather than intent—in
its narrow construction of the “sham exception” of the Noerr-Pennington
104. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. at 144.
105. See id.
106. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669–72 (1965); see
also Daerr-Bannon, supra note 97.
107. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 659–60.
108. Id.; see also PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 25.
109. Daerr-Bannon, supra note 97 (quoting Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 365 (1991).
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Doctrine.113 Omni involved an antitrust action wherein Omni Outdoor
Advertising (OOA) alleged that Columbia Outdoor Advertising (COA)
violated the Sherman Antitrust Act when it lobbied city council members
to adopt restrictive zoning ordinances that created anticompetitive
impacts.114 OOA argued that COA’s petitioning of the city council
triggered the “sham exception” of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine; the
Court disagreed.115 The Court stated that the exception is limited to
“situations in which persons use the governmental process itself—as
opposed to the outcome of that process—as an anticompetitive
weapon.”116 The Court reasoned that COA unquestionably intended to
interfere with OOA’s business, but it did not attempt to do so through the
lobbying process; instead, it relied on “the ultimate product of that
lobbying and consideration, viz., the zoning ordinances.”117
Courts have invoked the objective, outcome-focused NoerrPennington-Omni standard in contexts far beyond the bounds of antitrust
litigation.118 Moreover, it is generally accepted that its foundational
principles apply broadly to any instance involving activity that falls within
the scope of the Petition Clause.119 As the Court reflected in Omni:
[I]t is obviously peculiar in a democracy, and perhaps in derogation of
the constitutional right “to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances,” to establish a category of lawful state action that citizens
are not permitted to urge. Thus, beginning with [Noerr], we have
[ruled that the] federal antitrust laws . . . do not regulate the conduct
of private individuals in seeking anticompetitive action from the
government. This doctrine . . . rests ultimately upon a recognition that
the antitrust laws, “tailored as they are for the business world, are not
at all appropriate for application in the political arena.” 120

113. See Daniel O. Conkle, Combatting SLAPPs: Absolutism Is Not the Answer, 49 FED.
COMM. L.J. 761, 764 (1997).
114. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. at 368–69.
115. Id. at 380–81.
116. Id. (first emphasis added). In this instance, the phrase “outcome of [the]
governmental process” refers to judgments, legislation, and other forms of government action
and/or inaction. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 27. Using the “governmental process” as an
anticompetitive weapon refers to “invok[ing] the costs, delays, and inconveniences of the
government procedure only, without regard to outcome.” Id.
117. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. at 381.
118. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 28; see also Daerr-Bannon, supra note 97.
119. Daerr-Bannon, supra note 97.
120. Conkle, supra note 113, at 764 n.29 (quoting Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S.
at 379–80).
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In essence, the Court’s antitrust jurisprudence demonstrates that
activity in the political arena demands safeguarding against legal actions
that arise in response to conduct that constitutes First Amendment
petitioning.121
II. THE MASSACHUSETTS ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE
On December 29, 1994, the Massachusetts Legislature enacted
Chapter 231, Section 59H, of the Massachusetts General Laws—
legislation commonly known as the Massachusetts Anti-SLAPP
Statute.122 Enacted over the veto of Governor William Weld, the statute
reflected the legislature’s recognition of, and response to, the “disturbing
increase” in lawsuits brought to intimidate and discourage citizens from
exercising their right to petition.123 Courts and scholars alike, however,
have identified one particular lawsuit as the “impetus for [the]
introduction of the anti-SLAPP legislation.”124 The lawsuit arose in 1991
between fifteen residents of Rehoboth, Massachusetts and a developer
seeking residential construction permits.125 Out of concern for local
wetland protection, the residents signed a petition opposing the
construction project.126 In response, the developer brought suit.127 After
nine months of litigation and $30,000 in legal fees, the lawsuit’s dismissal
provided relief to the Rehoboth residents and prompted legislators to
create a procedural remedy for the early dismissal of such burdensome,
costly, and vexatious litigation.128 Although “[t]he typical mischief that
the legislation intended to remedy was lawsuits directed at individual
citizens of modest means for speaking publicly against development

121. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 28.
122. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (2018); David A. Kluft, The Scalpel or the
Bludgeon? Twenty Years of Anti-SLAPP in Massachusetts, BOS. B.J. (Jul. 9, 2014),
https://bostonbarjournal.com/2014/07/09/the-scalpel-or-the-bludgeon-twenty-years-of-antislapp-in-massachusetts/ [https://perma.cc/X8KR-BRFJ].
123. Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 691 N.E.2d 935, 939 (Mass. 1998).
124. Id.; Kluft, supra note 122.
125. Duracraft Corp., 691 N.E.2d at 939.
126. Id.
127. Id. See generally Linda Borg, Citizens Favor Ban on SLAPP Suits: Residents Testify
That the Lawsuits Brought By Big Businesses Deprive Them of Their First Amendment Rights,
PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 23, 1993, at C01, 1993 WLNR 5768283. The developer, South State
Savings Bank of Brockton, claimed the residents’ petition was “a ‘conspiracy’ that ‘interfered
with the advantageous business relations of the bank.’” Id.
128. Duracraft Corp., 691 N.E.2d at 939.
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projects,”129 judicial interpretation of the statute has vastly expanded its
reach.130
A. Procedural Elements of the Massachusetts Anti-SLAPP Statute
The Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute adjusts state civil procedure
by permitting a defendant to bring an expedited special motion to dismiss
when the claims asserted against the defendant are based on his or her
petitioning activity.131 In relevant part, the statute provides:
In any case in which a party asserts that the civil claims,
counterclaims, or cross claims against said party are based on said
party’s exercise of its right of petition under the constitution of the
United States or of the commonwealth, said party may bring a special
motion to dismiss. The court shall advance any such special motion
so that it may be heard and determined as expeditiously as possible.
The court shall grant such special motion, unless the party against
whom such special motion is made shows that: (1) the moving party’s
exercise of its right to petition was devoid of any reasonable factual
support or any arguable basis in law and (2) the moving party’s acts
caused actual injury to the responding party. In making its
determination, the court shall consider the pleadings and supporting
and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or
defense is based.132

A defendant may file the special motion to dismiss “within sixty days
of the service of the complaint.”133 Typically, once the special motion is
filed, discovery proceedings are stayed.134 In addition to creating a
procedure to stay and terminate lawsuits based on petitioning, the statute
states that “[i]f the court grants [the] special motion to dismiss, the court
shall award the moving party costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.”135
Special motions to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statute are subject
to a now well-established two-step burden-shifting test.136 In the first
129. Id. at 940.
130. See, e.g., Kluft, supra note 122.
131. Yurko & Choy, supra note 5, at 16.
132. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (2018).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. Under the anti-SLAPP statute, judges have no discretion with respect to the
payment of attorney’s fees and costs. McLarnon v. Jokisch, 727 N.E.2d 813, 818 (Mass. 2000).
136. See Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 691 N.E.2d 935, 943 (Mass. 1998). The
two-part test arose from the court’s acknowledgement that a persistent conundrum had
“bedeviled the statute’s application.” Id. Specifically, “[b]y protecting one party’s exercise of
its right of petition, unless it can be shown to be sham petitioning, the statute impinges on the
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stage, the special movant must “make a threshold showing through the
pleadings and affidavits that the claims against it are ‘based on’ the
petitioning activities alone and have no substantial basis other than or in
addition to the petitioning activities.”137 If the special movant meets its
initial burden, the statute requires the burden to shift to the nonmoving
party.138 The nonmoving party must then “show by a preponderance of
the evidence that the moving party lacked any reasonable factual support
or any arguable basis in law for its petitioning activity.”139 If the special
motion to dismiss is denied, defendants have a right to interlocutory
appellate review.140
B. Five Statutorily Enumerated Definitions of Petitioning
Litigation under the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute often turns on
whether the lawsuit is based on the defendant’s petitioning activity.141 As
an initial matter, therefore, allowance or denial of the special motion to
dismiss requires courts to determine whether the conduct at issue
constitutes petitioning.142 The statute broadly defines the protected right
to petition143:
As used in this section, the words “a party’s exercise of its right
of petition” shall mean any written or oral statement made before or
submitted to a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other
adverse party’s exercise of its right to petition, even when it is not engaged in sham petitioning.”
Id. Whereas the Massachusetts appeals court interpreted “the statutory language ‘shall
grant . . . [the] special motion’ as ‘may’ grant,” the SJC developed the two-part test and thereby
disallowed “committing decisions on such special motions to dismiss wholly to judicial
discretion.” Id. (second alteration in original).
137. Id.
138. Id. But see Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., Inc., 75 N.E.3d 21, 38 (Mass. 2017)
(“A nonmoving party’s claim is not subject to dismissal as one ‘based on’ a special movant’s
petitioning activity if, when the burden shifts to it, the nonmoving party can establish that its
suit was not ‘brought primarily to chill’ the special movant’s legitimate exercise of its right to
petition.”). The augmentation of the Duracraft framework warrants recognition, but because it
does not impact the original two-step test, or judicial determinations regarding the definition of
petitioning, discussion of the alternative showing exceeds the scope of this Note. Id.
139. Baker v. Parsons, 750 N.E.2d 953, 961 (Mass. 2001).
140. Fabre v. Walton, 781 N.E.2d 780, 784 (Mass. 2002) (“As in the governmental
immunity context, the denial of a special motion to dismiss interferes with rights in a way that
cannot be remedied on appeal from the final judgment.”).
141. Pyle, supra note 14 (explaining that a special motion to dismiss under an anti-SLAPP
statute is typically won or lost on the question of whether the activity is petitioning).
142. Id.
143. N. Am. Expositions Co. v. Corcoran, 898 N.E.2d 831, 840–41 (Mass. 2009)
(“Consistent with the expressed legislative intent, ‘petitioning’ has been consistently defined to
encompass a ‘very broad’ range of activities in the context of the anti-SLAPP statute.”).
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governmental proceeding; any written or oral statement made in
connection with an issue under consideration or review by a
legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other governmental
proceeding; any statement reasonably likely to encourage
consideration or review of an issue by a legislative, executive, or
judicial body or any other governmental proceeding; any statement
reasonably likely to enlist public participation in an effort to effect
such consideration; or any other statement falling within constitutional
protection of the right to petition government. 144

Following the statute’s enactment, the SJC recognized that specific
activities meet the definition of petitioning: campaigning in elections,
lobbying governmental bodies, and performing demonstrations all amount
to petitioning activity apt for a SLAPP attack.145 Not all activities,
however, clearly fall within the definition of petitioning activity.146
Because the statute enumerates five categories of a party’s exercise of its
right to petition,147 courts must employ canons of statutory construction to
determine whether the activity seeking the statute’s special motion to
dismiss constitutes petitioning.148
C. Initial Interpretations of the Massachusetts Anti-SLAPP Statute
The SJC interpreted the anti-SLAPP statute for the first time in its
landmark decision, Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Products Corp.149 The
court identified the legislature’s failure to “address concerns over [the
statute’s] breadth and reach”150 as the impetus for its initial attempt to
construe the statute in a way that averted unconstitutionality and
“preserve[d] as much of the legislative intent as . . . possible.”151 Judicial
interpretation of the statute following the Duracraft opinion has similarly

144. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (2018).
145. Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 691 N.E.2d 935, 940 (Mass. 1998) (citing
George W. Pring, SLAPPS: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 3, 5–6 (1989)).
146. See, e.g., Andrew R. Dennington, Do Anti-SLAPP Statutes Protect Bloggers?, 59
DRI FOR DEF. 36, 39 (2017) (explaining that there is no “bright-line rule” for determining
whether a particular blog constitutes protected petitioning activity).
147. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (2018).
148. Kobrin v. Gastfriend, 821 N.E.2d 60, 63 (Mass. 2005); see also SHAMBIE SINGER,
3A SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 67.2 (8th ed. 2018) (“The key
to interpreting a procedural statute is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent as expressed
in the statute.”).
149. Duracraft Corp., 691 N.E.2d at 939; see also Hoffberg, supra note 5, at 100.
150. Duracraft Corp., 691 N.E.2d at 941.
151. Id. at 943.
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sought to preserve the statute’s legislative intent.152 For instance, in
Kobrin v. Gastfriend, the court explained that in determining whether an
activity falls within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute, the court applies
[T]he general rule of statutory construction that a statute is to be
interpreted “according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from
all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the
language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment,
the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be
accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be
effectuated.”153

Accordingly, Massachusetts courts have ascertained from the text of
the statute and the cause of its enactment that the right to petition protected
by the anti-SLAPP statute is the right contained within the Petition Clause
of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.154
Although the SJC has
acknowledged that a broad definition of petitioning activity is consistent
with the statute’s legislative intent, it has also recognized that the “scope
of the statute has its limits.”155 In finding that “[t]he right of petition
contemplated by the Legislature is . . . one in which a party seeks some
redress from the government,” the court established a critical limitation—
one that “expressly implicat[es] the term’s constitutional meaning” in the
process of determining whether an activity constitutes petitioning under
the anti-SLAPP statute.156

152. See Fustolo v. Hollander, 920 N.E.2d 837, 840 (Mass. 2010); N. Am. Expositions
Co. v. Corcoran, 898 N.E.2d 831, 840 (Mass. 2009); Kobrin, 821 N.E.2d at 64; Fabre v. Walton,
781 N.E.2d 780, 783 (Mass. 2002); Baker v. Parsons, 750 N.E.2d 953, 959 (Mass. 2001).
153. Kobrin, 821 N.E.2d at 63–64 (quoting Triplett v. Oxford, 791 N.E.2d 310, 313
(Mass. 2003)); see also SINGER, supra note 148 (“The statute’s language is the best and most
reliable index of the statute’s meaning and must be consulted first. The language of the statute
may be construed in view of the statute’s purpose.”).
154. See Kobrin, 821 N.E.2d at 65 (“The constitutional ‘right of petition’ is a term of art
that the Legislature did not adopt casually or accidentally. The Legislature’s decision to refer
to the right of petition secured in the Federal and State Constitutions must be accorded
significance in order to effectuate the legislative intent.”).
155. Id. at 67; see also Corcoran, 898 N.E.2d at 840–41 (“Consistent with the expressed
legislative intent, ‘petitioning’ has been consistently defined to encompass a ‘very broad’ range
of activities in the context of the anti-SLAPP statute.”).
156. Kobrin, 821 N.E.2d at 65.
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III. INVOKING OBJECTIVITY TO EFFECTUATE THE MASSACHUSETTS
ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE’S LEGISLATIVE INTENT
Prior to the enactment of the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute,
Governor William Weld described the legislation “as ‘a bludgeon when a
scalpel would do.’”157 Against the backdrop of this characterization,
practitioners and legal scholars have argued that the Massachusetts courts
have wavered between each metaphor in applying the statute’s
provisions.158 David A. Kluft, for instance, observed that “[w]hile some
decisions have expanded—or confirmed—broad access to the statute’s
protections, other decisions have sharpened and narrowed the kind of
activity it protects.”159 Although examinations of Massachusetts’s antiSLAPP jurisprudence have reviewed the courts’ record of expanding
access to effectuate the legislative intent, while also simultaneously
limiting the scope of “petitioning activity,” the significance of objectively
evaluating statements has gone largely undiscussed.160 In the following
subparts, this Note illustrates two instances in which the courts have
invoked objectivity to reconcile the expansive reach of the statute with the
legislature’s intent to promote a fully involved citizenry and protect the
constitutional right to petition. The first subpart addresses judicial
removal of the public concern element,161 and the second subpart
discusses the judiciary’s development of the mirror image rule.162
A. The Public Concern Element
Although a sizeable number of state legislatures have limited
citizens’ access to special anti-SLAPP procedural protections by inserting

157. Kluft, supra note 122.
158. See id.
159. Kluft, supra note 122. David A. Kluft is a partner at Foley Hoag in Boston,
Massachusetts. Our People, FOLEY HOAG, http://www.foleyhoag.com/people/kluft-david
[https://perma.cc/WUQ7-MA62].
160. But see Richard J. Yurko, Fasten Your Seatbelt: The SJC Revises the Standard for
Anti-SLAPP Motions, BOS. B.J. (Aug. 9, 2017), https://bostonbarjournal.com/2017/08/09/
fasten-your-seatbelt-the-sjc-revises-the-standard-for-anti-slapp-motions/
[https://perma.cc/J5CG-BNXQ].
161. See infra Section III.A; see also Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 691 N.E.2d
935, 941 (Mass. 1998) (holding that petitioning activity need not involve a matter of public
concern in order to qualify for protection under the statute).
162. See infra Section III.B; see also, e.g., Wynne v. Creigle, 825 N.E.2d 559, 566 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2005) (finding that the repetition of statements to media may possess the characteristics
of petitioning as defined in the statute).
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a public concern requirement,163 the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute
invokes no such condition.164 Initially, judicial interpretation of the
statute—in the time between its enactment and the issuance of the
Duracraft opinion—confined its application to instances in which citizens
were sued for speaking out on matters of public concern.165 In Duracraft,
however, the court reasoned “that the phrase ‘public concern’ was struck
from the [anti-SLAPP] bill before it was passed in final form.”166 The
court acknowledged that legislative debate relating to the statute’s
enactment included discussions about the “need to protect the right of
petition on matters of public concern,” but placed significant weight on
the fact that “the phrase was removed from the text of the statute.”167 It
would be inappropriate, the court reasoned, to read a public concern
element into the statute when the condition was expressly removed by the
legislature.168 With its firm rejection of the public concern requirement,
the court underscored an important feature of the Massachusetts statute—
one that both reflects and effects the legislature’s “inten[t] to enact very
broad protection for petitioning activities.”169
Critics of the Duracraft decision contend that foregoing the public
concern requirement consigns the anti-SLAPP statute’s original objective
to oblivion.170 For instance, one scholar argues that while “[Duracraft] is
consistent with the language in the statute, [it is] inconsistent with the
policies underlying the concept of anti-SLAPP statutes, namely, to
remove legal impediments on citizens seeking to speak out on matters of
public concern.”171 The Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute, however, was
specifically designed to safeguard the constitutional right to petition.172
163. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-7-7-1(a) (2018) (“This chapter applies to an act in
furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the Constitution of the United
States or the Constitution of the State of Indiana in connection with a public issue or an issue of
public interest.”); 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-33-2 (2018) (protecting claims based on a person’s
exercise of the right to petition or right of free speech “in connection with a matter of public
concern”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1041 (2018) (requiring exercise of the right to petition or
right of free speech to be “in connection with a public issue”).
164. McLarnon v. Jokisch, 727 N.E.2d 813, 816 (Mass. 2000).
165. Hoffberg, supra note 5, at 102.
166. Duracraft Corp., 691 N.E.2d at 941.
167. Id.
168. See id.
169. Id. at 940. But see Hoffberg, supra note 5, at 102–06 (arguing the removal of the
public concern element is inconsistent with the anti-SLAPP statute’s underlying policy
objectives).
170. See Hoffberg, supra note 5, at 106; see also Kluft, supra note 122.
171. Hoffberg, supra note 5, at 105–06.
172. Kobrin v. Gastfriend, 821 N.E.2d 60, 66 (Mass. 2005).
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“The Legislature intended the statute to encourage ‘full participation by
persons and organizations and robust discussion of issues before
legislative, judicial, and administrative bodies.’”173 Conceivably, “full
participation” and “robust discussion”—two fundamental aspects of the
democratic process reflected in petitioning activities174—encompass
matters beyond the classic SLAPP paradigm.175 Nonetheless, proponents
of the public interest requirement argue that in its absence, there exists no
clear criteria for determining an individual’s eligibility to assert the status
of “petitioner.”176 Post-Duracraft anti-SLAPP jurisprudence, however,
indicates otherwise.
The Massachusetts courts’ resolution of lawsuits involving private
disputes and the anti-SLAPP statute demonstrate that the qualification—
the criteria for eligibility—lies with the nature of the special movant’s
conduct.177 Implicated by the first-prong of the two-prong anti-SLAPP
framework, a court’s evaluation of the alleged petitioning activity
necessitates a focus on conduct.178 For instance, in Office One, Inc. v.
Lopez, the court stated that initially, “[t]he focus solely is on the conduct
complained of, and, if the only conduct complained of is petitioning
activity, then there can be no other ‘substantial basis’ for the claim.”179 In
Office One, the purchasers of commercial condominium units filed suit
against the condominium’s board of trustees for defamation and alleged
business interference.180 The court determined that the suit was based on
the board members’ communications with the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), which urged against the sale of condominium units
to the plaintiff.181 Because the “FDIC acts ‘in the name of, or on behalf

173. Id. (quoting Preamble to 1994 House Doc. No. 1520).
174. Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 691 N.E.2d 935, 939 (Mass. 1998).
175. See generally Hoffberg, supra note 5, at 97–99 (illustrating the classic SLAPP
paradigm).
176. See id. at 104–06 (contending there is a “near limitless eligibility” to qualify for
immunity under the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute).
177. See Office One, Inc. v. Lopez, 769 N.E.2d 749, 756–57 (Mass. 2002); McLarnon v.
Jokisch, 727 N.E.2d 813, 817 (Mass. 2000); Donovan v. Gardner, 740 N.E.2d 639, 641–44
(Mass. App. Ct. 2000).
178. See supra Section II.B.
179. Office One, Inc., 769 N.E.2d at 757.
180. Id. at 749.
181. Id. at 757 (“All of the conduct alleged as unlawful falls within the broad definition
of petitioning activity protected by the statute.”). In addition to the board members’ direct
communications with the FDIC, the court also considered communications between unit owners
urging one another to petition against the FDIC’s sale of units to plaintiff as petitioning activity.
Id.
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of, the United States’ to promote stability [in the] banking system,”182 the
conduct at issue reflected the very core of petitioning—that is, the seeking
of governmental redress. The nature of the allegedly unlawful conduct
was dispositive of whether the special movants were eligible to invoke the
anti-SLAPP statute’s protection.183 Consequently, because “[t]he right to
petition a governmental body for redress of a grievance is the very essence
of petitioning activity,”184 the court’s extension of protection to special
movants who have sought governmental redress on a matter of private
concern seemingly effectuates, rather than subverts, the statute’s
legislative intent.
B. The Mirror Image Rule
Consistent with the text and expressed legislative intent of the
Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute, courts often find that statements made
apart from official government proceedings constitute petitioning
activity.185 Special motions seeking protection for statements made to the
media have generated a great deal of debate within the Massachusetts
Appeals Court’s anti-SLAPP jurisprudence.186 Because the statute “was
enacted by the Legislature to protect citizens from lawsuits designed to
chill their constitutional right to petition the government for redress of
grievances,”187 the appeals court—in line with the SJC—reasoned “that
the protection of the statute extends only to petitioning in a constitutional
sense, that is, activities that involve a seeking [of redress] from the
government.”188 In the context of statements made to the media, the issue
became whether a statement made to the press can satisfy the standard of
seeking governmental redress. Massachusetts courts answered this
question in the affirmative.189 But how can a statement directed to the
press, as opposed to the government, qualify as a petition in the

182. Id. at 757 n.15 (quoting United States v. Sweeney, 226 F.3d 43, 46 (1st Cir. 2000)).
183. See id. at 757.
184. N. Am. Expositions Co. v. Corcoran, 898 N.E.2d 831, 841 (Mass. 2009).
185. Id. at 840–41.
186. See generally Kalter v. Wood, 855 N.E.2d 421 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006); Global Naps,
Inc. v. Verizon New Eng., Inc., 828 N.E.2d 529 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005); Wynne v. Creigle, 825
N.E.2d 559 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005).
187. Wynne, 825 N.E.2d at 564.
188. Id. at 565.
189. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., Inc., 75 N.E.3d 21, 32 (Mass. 2017)
(finding statements made to the Boston Globe constituted petitioning activity under the
Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute).
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constitutional sense of the term? The answer lies with the mirror image
rule.
The appeals court first developed the mirror image rule in Wynne v.
Creigle.190 The rule serves as a means of identifying a statement’s
connection to the seeking of governmental redress; in applying the rule,
courts jointly consider a statement’s content and the context in which it
occurred.191 In Wynne, Thomas Wynne, Jr., a discharged firefighter,
brought a defamation action against Amy Creigle, the surviving spouse of
a former firefighter.192 Prior to the lawsuit, Wynne was under
investigation for professional misconduct by the Greenfield Fire
Department.193 In connection with the investigation, Creigle submitted
written testimony to the department indicating that she and her deceased
husband had been repeatedly harassed by Wynne.194 Thereafter, Creigle
made statements to the Greenfield Recorder regarding the harassment she
endured before and after her husband’s death.195 Three years after the
pertinent article’s publication, Wynne filed suit against Creigle for
defamation on May 4, 2001.196 In response, Creigle filed an anti-SLAPP
special motion to dismiss.197 In considering the anti-SLAPP motion on
appeal, the court reasoned that the statements made to The Recorder
[M]ust be viewed in the context in which they occurred: as a response
to the plaintiff’s providing the newspaper with the statements of the
firefighters, other documents from the hearing of June 15, 1998, and
his dismissal letter. The later statements of the defendant to The
Recorder were essentially mirror images of those she made during and
“in connection with” the departmental investigation of the plaintiff.

190. Wynne, 825 N.E.2d at 566. Although the SJC has not explicitly invoked the mirror
image rule, it has referenced the standard. See Corcoran, 898 N.E.2d at 841 (citing to the court’s
use of “mirror image” language in Wynne); see also Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann, 859 N.E.2d
858, 865 (Mass. 2007) (finding challenged statements were not repetitions of statements initially
made to a government body, and therefore not petitioning activity under the anti-SLAPP
statute).
191. See Wynne, 825 N.E.2d at 565–66.
192. Id. at 563.
193. Id. at 562.
194. Id. at 562–63.
195. Id. at 563 (“[Creigle] also reiterated many of the comments she made in her May 15,
1998 statement to the fire department, namely that the plaintiff harassed her family shortly
before and after her husband’s death.”).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 564. Initially, the defendant’s special motion to dismiss was allowed. Id.
Plaintiff made a motion for relief from the judgment of dismissal, but that motion was denied.
Id. In a second judgment, under the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute, the defendant was
awarded attorney’s fees and costs. Id. Thereafter, the plaintiff appealed. Id.
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Taken in context, her mere repetition of those statements to the media
was also possessed of the characteristics of petitioning activity.198

In other words, the content of the statement, in conjunction with the
context in which the statement was given, satisfied the statutory
requirement of exercising the right to petition because it reflected the
essence of petitioning activity—that is, the seeking of governmental
redress.
In cases following Wynne, the appeals court further refined the mirror
image rule as a means of limiting the statute’s expansive scope.199 For
instance, in Global Naps, Inc. v. Verizon New England, Inc., the court
rejected Verizon’s claim that its employee’s statement to the Boston Globe
satisfied the statutory definition of petitioning.200 Verizon argued that the
statement at issue met the “in connection with” definition of petitioning
because the statement referenced a matter under review by the Department
of Telecommunications and Energy (DTE).201 Referencing Wynne, the
court reasoned that “the statements [at issue] were not ‘mirror images’ of
what was said in a governmental forum, nor were they made in
conjunction with any legislative petitioning. . . . Instead, the comments
were incidental observations that were not tied to the petitioning activity
in a direct way.”202 Based on the content of the statement—and the
context in which it occurred—the court narrowly tailored the “in
connection with” definition of petitioning.203 In recognition of the fact
that the right to petition contemplated by the statute encompasses the
seeking of government redress, the court reasoned that “tangential
statements” unrelated to the petitioning process fall beyond the ambit of
the statute.204 “That a statement concerns a topic that has attracted

198. Id. at 565–66 (footnote omitted).
199. See, e.g., Global Naps, Inc. v. Verizon New Eng., Inc., 828 N.E.2d 529, 533–34
(Mass. App. Ct. 2005).
200. Id. at 530.
201. See id. at 531; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (2018).
202. Global Naps, Inc., 828 N.E.2d at 534 (citation omitted).
203. Id. at 532. The court also reasoned that the context of the statute must be taken into
account when evaluating a statement’s eligibility for protection. Id. The other enumerated
definitions of petitioning—specifically the first, third, and fourth definitions—“support reading
‘in connection with’ as embodying, to some extent, similar purposive elements.” Id. In a similar
vein, the court faulted Verizon’s argument for failing to recognize the significance of the antiSLAPP statute’s reference “to a ‘party’s exercise of its right of petition under the constitution
of the United States or of the Commonwealth.’” Id. (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231,
§ 59H). The statutory language precludes the inclusion of statements made “to influence public
opinion in a general way unrelated to government involvement.” Id. at 534.
204. See id. at 534.
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governmental attention, in itself, does not give that statement the character
contemplated by the statute.”205
Although the SJC has yet to formally apply the mirror image rule in
its anti-SLAPP jurisprudence, it has recognized and relied on the rule’s
underlying principles.206 Statements directed to the press may very well
constitute petitioning under the broad definition afforded by the statute,
but such statements must possess the essential characteristics of the
constitutional right to petition as contemplated by the legislature.207
Considerations of a statement’s content and context are critical in
determining whether a statement constitutes petitioning activity.208
IV. VEERING OFF COURSE: THE CARDNO CHEMRISK ANALYSIS
The way in which a court reaches its result is just as important—if
not more important—than the result itself.209 Principled decision making
is preferred over result-oriented jurisprudence.210 In Cardno ChemRisk,
LLC v. Foytlin, the analysis wavered between principled and resultoriented.211 The court persuasively recounted the facts to establish the
defendants—Cherri Foytlin and Karen Savage—as citizens of modest
means with an extensive record of environmental advocacy.212 After
identifying Foytlin as a full-time activist and Savage as a participant in
environmental advocacy, the court relayed that “both defendants have
devoted substantial time to exploring [the oil spill’s] environmental
consequences, particularly its effects on cleanup workers, and to
advocating on behalf of those adversely affected.”213 Foytlin, the court
explained, “is a mother of six [who] support[s] herself with modest
monthly stipends” and Savage is a former middle school teacher and a
single mother of four.214 Moreover, the court chronicled the defendants’

205. Id. at 533.
206. See N. Am. Expositions Co. v. Corcoran, 898 N.E.2d 831, 841 (Mass. 2009). With
reference to the concept of “mirror images” discussed in Wynne, the SJC stated that “[i]n order
to determine if statements are petitioning, we consider them in the over-all context in which
they were made.” Id.
207. See Kobrin v. Gastfriend, 821 N.E.2d 60, 65–66 (Mass. 2005).
208. See N. Am. Expositions Co., 898 N.E.2d at 841.
209. LEONARD W. LEVY, AGAINST THE LAW: THE NIXON COURT AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 437 (1974).
210. See id.
211. Cardno ChemRisk, LLC v. Foytlin, 68 N.E.3d 1180, 1186–91 (Mass. 2017).
212. Id. at 1184.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1186 n.10.
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efforts to raise awareness of the consequences of the spill,215 which
included “marching from New Orleans to Washington,
D.C.[,] . . . meeting with federal officials[,] and corresponding with
federal agencies such as . . . the Environmental Protection Agency
[and] . . . the Department of Health and Human Services.”216 Importantly,
the court couched the blog post, the statement at issue under the statute,
as one of the defendants’ efforts in this regard.217
The court’s portrayal of the “pertinent” factual background material
was not haphazard; indeed, it was integral to the finding that the
defendants were petitioning in their own right as citizens.218 Intentions
aside, the court effectively shifted its focus from the substance of the
statement at issue to the standing of the defendants that drafted it. As a
result, the court’s assessment of the well-established threshold question—
whether the statement fits within one of the five statutorily enumerated
categories219—and ultimate determination possessed an element of
inevitability:
The Huffington Post blog posting falls within at least one of the
enumerated definitional categories. It formed part of the defendants’
ongoing efforts to influence governmental bodies by increasing the
amount and tenor of coverage around the environmental consequences
of the spill, and it closes with an implicit call for its readers to take
action. Given this, the article fits squarely within the second [sic]
clause of G. L. c. 231 § 59H: “any statement reasonably likely to enlist
public participation.”220

In this passage, the court proffered two factors to support its finding:
the blog “formed part of the defendants’ ongoing efforts” and it includes
an implicit call for action.221 Here, the court focused chiefly on the
defendants’ intent222—a factor the court previously deemed irrelevant to

215. Id. at 1187.
216. Id. at n.13.
217. Id. at 1184.
218. See id. at 1184–85, 1190.
219. See supra Section II.B.
220. Cardno ChemRisk, LLC, 68 N.E.3d at 1187–88 (footnotes omitted).
221. Id.
222. See Dennington, supra note 146, at 37 (discussing Cardno ChemRisk, LLC and the
tendency of courts to engage in scienter-like analyses when determining whether particular
online statements are petitioning activity).
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the first prong of the anti-SLAPP two-part test.223 Rather than
distinguishing the statement at issue from the motive behind the statement,
the court invested substantial weight in the defendants’ intent in
determining that the blog post fit the statute’s definition of petitioning.224
Similarly, with respect to the second factor, the implicit call, the court
attributed great significance to the final sentence of the blog post.225
Earlier in the opinion, the court framed the final sentence as a question:
“The article closes by asking whether ‘anyone will ever . . . make [things]
right’ in the Gulf Coast.”226 In actuality, the article does not close with a
question, but rather an assertion:
Meanwhile, and while the BP trial continues in New Orleans,
Gulf Coast residents are left wondering if BP will ever be held
responsible for the damage done to their fisheries, ecosystems and
livelihoods, wait to see if their bodies will ever recover from an assault
of BP’s oil and dispersants, and wonder if anyone will ever—in the
words of Purple Strategies’ spin writers, found in the mouth of former
BP President Tony Hayward—“make it right.”227

Nonetheless, the court held that the statement was an implicit call for
action and thereby an exercise of the defendants’ right to petition.228 In so
holding, the court vastly expanded the scope of the phrase “reasonably
likely.”229 Moreover, in its analysis, the court did not include the entirety
of the fourth definitional category, which reads as follows: “any statement
reasonably likely to enlist public participation in an effort to effect such
consideration.”230 The portion of the clause omitted from the opinion
refers to the third clause: “any statement reasonably likely to encourage
consideration or review of an issue by a legislative, executive, or judicial

223. Office One, Inc. v. Lopez, 769 N.E.2d 749, 757 (Mass. 2002) (holding a petitioner’s
motive is irrelevant with respect to the first prong of the test because the conduct complained of
is the sole focus).
224. See Cardno ChemRisk, LLC, 68 N.E.3d at 1187–88.
225. See id.
226. Id. at 1185 (alteration in original).
227. Foytlin & Savage, supra note 16.
228. Cardno ChemRisk, LLC, 68 N.E.3d at 1187.
229. See Fustolo v. Hollander, 920 N.E.2d 837, 841 (Mass. 2010) (assuming without
deciding that the contents of an article fit the enlistment clause because the article created so
much community opposition that developer had to withdraw variance application); Office One,
Inc. v. Lopez, 769 N.E.2d 749, 757 (Mass. 2002) (holding condominium unit owners urging
other unit owners to petition the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation against the sale of the
condominiums fit the enlistment clause of the anti-SLAPP statute).
230. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (2018); see also Cardno ChemRisk, LLC, 68
N.E.3d at 1187–88.
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body or any other governmental proceeding.”231 In failing to include the
full text of the definition, the court failed to give effect to the full text of
the clause; specifically, the relevance of the public’s effort to effect
governmental consideration to the definition of petitioning activity.232
Under close inspection, the conclusory method of analysis
undertaken by the court with respect to the definition of petitioning marks
a departure from Massachusetts’ existing anti-SLAPP jurisprudence.233 In
its opinion, the court stated that its “cases recognize that the anti-SLAPP
statute, like the constitutional right it safeguards, protects those looking to
‘advanc[e] causes in which they believe,’ as well as those seeking to
protect their own private rights.”234 Importantly, however, the court has
previously recognized that despite the legislature’s intent to enact very
broad protection, “the scope of the statute has its limits.”235 Moreover, the
court has acknowledged that the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute—
unlike similar statutes in other states—only protects the right to petition,
not all First Amendment rights.236 Therefore, while the statute may afford
courts the opportunity to protect those looking to advance causes in which
they believe, the statute only extends its procedural protections to those
who exercise their right to petition—regardless of intent, purpose, or
cause.237
Despite the SJC’s recognition of boundaries in its previous antiSLAPP jurisprudence, its extension of the statute’s protection in Cardno
ChemRisk, LLC v. Foytlin was heralded by attorneys and civil rights
activists as an important decision in an era in which the right to petition

231. Supra note 230.
232. See Kobrin v. Gastfriend, 821 N.E.2d 60, 68 (Mass. 2005) (reasoning courts are
obligated to give meaning to all of a statute’s words); see also SINGER, supra note 148. “Courts
assume every word, phrase, and clause in a legislative enactment is intended and has some
meaning and none is inserted accidentally. Courts give effect to all the language of a statute as
a harmonious whole, rendering no portion meaningless or superfluous.” SINGER, supra note
148 (footnotes omitted).
233. See Yurko, supra note 160, at 38 n.3 (“[T]he Supreme Judicial Court [has] repeatedly
eschewed any inquiry into defendant’s subjective motive for petitioning in the first part of the
test.”).
234. Cardno ChemRisk, LLC, 68 N.E.3d at 1189 (alteration in original) (citation omitted)
(quoting Town of Hanover v. New Eng. Reg’l Council of Carpenters, 6 N.E.3d 522, 528 (Mass.
2014)).
235. Fustolo v. Hollander, 920 N.E.2d 837, 844 (Mass. 2010) (quoting Kobrin, 821
N.E.2d at 67).
236. Cardno ChemRisk, LLC, 68 N.E.3d at 1186 n.11; see also Fustolo, 920 N.E.2d at
844 n.12 (“The Massachusetts Legislature did not include ‘free speech’ in [the provisions of the
anti-SLAPP statute].”).
237. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (2018).
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must be safeguarded.238 In celebrating the decision as a “complete
victory,” Attorney John H. Reichman explained that “[t]he court made it
clear that a blogger who is writing about an issue of public concern, and
seeking to get the public involved . . . will be protected.”239 Ironically,
however, the court’s broad construction of the definition of the right to
petition obscures the legislative purpose underlying the anti-SLAPP
statute.240 The Massachusetts Legislature intended the statute to promote
and protect a fully involved citizenry,241 but the court’s conclusory
analysis diminishes the significance of a statement’s connection to
governmental participation under the anti-SLAPP statute.
V. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
After the Cardno ChemRisk, LLC v. Foytlin opinion, Massachusetts
courts are well-positioned to significantly weaken the critical connection
between petitioning activity and governmental participation under the
anti-SLAPP statute. The potential for further deviation from the statute’s
underlying policy objectives necessitates that Massachusetts adopt an
alternative interpretive framework—one that echoes its own early antiSLAPP jurisprudence242 and reflects methods of statutory construction
undertaken in other jurisdictions.243 In order to effectuate the legislative
policies underlying the anti-SLAPP statute, courts must objectively
distinguish between statements made to influence public opinion and
statements made to petition the government in the constitutional sense of
the phrase. The approaches undertaken by courts in Minnesota and
Pennsylvania serve as examples of invoking objective criteria to evaluate
a statement’s standing as petitioning activity.244 In each jurisdiction,
judicial interpretation effectuates the legislative intent of the state’s antiSLAPP statute by upholding the importance of the connection between
the right to petition and participation in government.
238. Ellement, supra note 43.
239. Id.
240. See Cardno ChemRisk, LLC, 68 N.E.3d at 1186–87; see also Kobrin, 821 N.E.2d at
68 (discussing the manner in which a broad interpretation of the anti-SLAPP statute may fail to
effect its legislative intent).
241. Kobrin, 821 N.E.2d. at 66.
242. See Office One, Inc. v. Lopez, 769 N.E.2d 749, 750 (Mass. 2002); see also Duracraft
Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 691 N.E.2d 935, 939 (Mass. 1998).
243. See SINGER, supra note 148 (“Where legislation is structured in the same manner as
the laws of other states . . . courts may look to cases from the other states . . . which have
construed such similar provisions for interpretive insight and guidance.”).
244. See Freeman v. Swift, 776 N.W.2d 485, 488–92 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009); Penllyn
Greene Assocs. v. Clouser, 890 A.2d 424, 429–32 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005).
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A. Minnesota’s Citizens Participation Act
The Minnesota Legislature enacted the Citizens Participation Act of
1994 several months before Massachusetts enacted its anti-SLAPP
statute.245 Although the wording of the Minnesota statute is significantly
different from the wording of the Massachusetts statute, the legislative
intent is the same: protecting citizen participation in government.246 The
Minnesota statute defines public participation as “speech or lawful speech
that is genuinely aimed in whole or in part at procuring favorable
government action.”247 Substantively, the statute immunizes such speech
or lawful conduct from liability—unless the conduct or speech constitutes
a tort or violation of a person’s constitutional rights.248 Upon enactment,
Professors Canan and Pring heralded the statute as “a breakthrough in
effectiveness” as it promised broad and straightforward protection for
public participation in government.249 Judicial interpretation of what
constitutes public participation in Minnesota warrants similar praise.250 In
primarily focusing on a statement’s content—rather than the subjective
intent of a speaker—the Minnesota courts offer an instructive method of
interpretation.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals first determined the definition and
scope of public participation in Freeman v. Swift.251 Three statements
were at issue in the case—an email and two blog posts regarding the chief
executive officer of Nexus, a juvenile sex-offender treatment facility set
for relocation in Bradbury Township.252 The author of the statements—
defendant Janette J. Swift—vigorously opposed the relocation of the
facility as a resident of Bradbury Township and the founder of Onamia
Area Citizens for Responsible Growth.253 Based upon the content of the
email and blog entries, the plaintiffs in the case sued Swift for defamation.

245. See 1994 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 566 (West); see also PRING & CANAN, supra
note 2, at 200.
246. Freeman, 776 N.W.2d at 488.
247. MINN. STAT. § 554.01(6) (2018); see also Lisa Blomgren Amsler & Tina Nabatchi,
Public Engagement and Decision-Making: Moving Minnesota Forward to Dialogue and
Deliberation, 42 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 1629, 1648–49 (2016) (noting that Minnesota
statutes, with the exception of MINN. STAT. § 554.01, fail to expressly define the contours of
public participation).
248. MINN. STAT. § 554.03 (2018).
249. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 200–01.
250. See, e.g., Freeman, 776 N.W.2d at 489.
251. Id. at 490.
252. Id. at 487.
253. Id.
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Swift moved unsuccessfully to dismiss the defamation action under
Minnesota’s anti-SLAPP statute.254
Similarly, based upon the content of the communications, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s determination that
the statements were not entitled to immunity under the statute.255 The
court held that “the determination of whether a communication is entitled
to immunity under section 554.03 depends on the nature of the statement,
the purpose of the statement, and the intended audience.”256 As in Cardno
ChemRisk, LLC v. Foytlin,257 the court assessed the nature of the statement
by extensively recounting the defendant’s activism relating to the
relocation of the treatment facility.258 Swift attended meetings and
presented petitions to government bodies involved, communicated her
strong opposition to state representatives, and expressed problems
associated with relocation to local government officials.259 Unlike the
SJC, however, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reasoned that “the mere
fact that discrete communications are made in the context of public
participation does not confer immunity.”260
Admittedly, the expansive breadth of the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP
statute—specifically the definition of petitioning activity as any statement
made in connection with an issue under consideration or review—requires
courts to consider the overall context in which the statements are made.261
Nonetheless, the exercise of distinguishing between the content of a
challenged statement and a speaker’s record of participation should be a
necessary step in the process of determining whether an activity
constitutes petitioning. This critical consideration ensures that the right to
petition is exercised before the statute’s procedural protections are
extended, thereby ensuring the statute’s language and legislative intent are
simultaneously given effect.

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Id.
Id. at 490.
Id.
Cardno ChemRisk, LLC v. Foytlin, 68 N.E.3d 1180, 1184–85 (Mass. 2017).
Freeman, 776 N.W.2d at 487.
Id.
Id. at 490.
N. Am. Expositions Co. v. Corcoran, 898 N.E.2d 831, 841 (Mass. 2009).
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B. Pennsylvania’s Participation in Environmental Law or Regulation
Act
Whereas Massachusetts and Minnesota extend anti-SLAPP
protections to petitioning activities in all contexts, Pennsylvania’s antiSLAPP legislation limits protection to public participation in the arena of
environmental law.262 The Pennsylvania Legislature enacted The
Participation in Environmental Law or Regulation Act on December 20,
2000.263 In the preamble of the Act, the General Assembly stated that “[i]t
is contrary to the public interest to allow lawsuits, known as Strategic
Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP), to be brought primarily
to chill the valid exercise by citizens of their constitutional right to
freedom of speech and to petition the government for the redress of
grievances.”264 Moreover, in contemplating the legislation, the General
Assembly reasoned that “[i]t is in the public interest to empower citizens
to bring a swift end to retaliatory lawsuits seeking to undermine their
participation in the establishment of State and local environmental policy
and in the implementation and enforcement of environmental law and
regulations.”265 Although the scope of Pennsylvania’s anti-SLAPP statute
is narrower than its Massachusetts companion, the statutes share a
common objective: to protect the constitutional right to petition.266
Section 8302 of The Participation in Environmental Law or
Regulation Act identifies the communications that are eligible for
protection as petitioning activity.267 Pursuant to the Act, the general rule
is that a person who
[F]iles an action in the courts of [the] Commonwealth to enforce an
environmental law or regulation or that makes an oral or written
communication to a government agency relating to enforcement or
implementation of an environmental law or regulation shall be
immune from civil liability in any resulting legal proceeding for
damages where the action or communication is aimed at procuring
favorable governmental action.268

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

See 27 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8301–05 (2018).
Id.
Preamble to the Act of December 20, 2000, Pub. L. 980, No. 138.
Id.
Penllyn Greene Assocs. v. Clouser, 890 A.2d 424, 434 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005).
27 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8302(a) (2018).
Id.
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The Act enumerates three categorical definitions of statements that
qualify for immunity under the Act.269 In addition to statements made
before executive, legislative, and judicial proceedings, the Act immunizes
statements made to government agencies in connection with the
enforcement of environmental regulations.270 Finally, the Act contains an
“in connection with” clause—statements made “in connection with an
issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive or judicial
body or any other official proceeding authorized by law” constitute
petitioning activity and are thus eligible for protection.271
As in Massachusetts, initial application of the Act’s “in connection
with” clause prompted the Pennsylvania judiciary to interpret the statutory
definition of petitioning activity.272 Despite the seemingly vast potential
for statements to meet the standard of “in connection with,” the
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court declared that “the Act does not
perfunctorily immunize all communications merely because they concern
an environmental issue under consideration or review by a government
body.”273 In Penllyn Greene Associates v. Clouser, the Commonwealth
Court recognized that the legislature embedded a purposive element
within the “in connection with” definition.274 The case involved a dispute
between two residential development firms and three residents of
Montgomery County, Pennsylvania.275 Following a two-year permitting
process, the developers began constructing residential homes on property
adjacent to the residents’ homes.276 In addition to publicly opposing the
development of the land, the residents filed a series of appeals challenging
the validity of the development project.277 After the residents withdrew
their appeal three hours before the scheduled hearing, the developers
brought suit against the residents for abuse of process and tortious
interference.278 In response, the residents sought immunity under The
269. 27 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8301 (2018).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. See Penllyn Greene Assocs. v. Clouser, 890 A.2d 424, 433 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005).
273. Id.
274. See id. (“The Act and the legislative intent are clear. Section 8302 of the Act, 27 Pa.
C. S. § 8302(a), affords immunity only where the communication or action is ‘aimed at
procuring favorable governmental action.’”).
275. Id. at 427.
276. Id.
277. See id. at 430 (“Residents claim that they began voicing their concerns to the local,
state and federal government in the 1980’s regarding the possibility of the adverse effects of
developing the Property which they asserted was contaminated.”).
278. Id. at 428. The developers also alleged trespass. Id.
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Participation in Environmental Law or Regulation Act by claiming that
the statements at issue were made “in connection with” a matter under
review.279
In its evaluation of the case, the Commonwealth Court reasoned that
“the Act was designed to protect those persons targeted by frivolous
lawsuits based on their constitutionally protected government petitioning
activities.”280
The court stated: “[w]hen determining whether a
communication is entitled to immunity, the court must look to the nature
of the statement keeping in mind the intended audience and the purpose
of the communication.”281 Whereas the residents argued that their
statements “were just a ‘continuation’ of their longstanding and
continuing governmental petitioning,” the court found that the nature of
the communications precluded an extension of the Act’s protection.282
Rather than rely on the residents’ record of past petitioning—and
subjectively stated motivations—the court looked to objective indicia in
order to determine the nature of the statements.283 The intended audience
of the statement, for instance, consisted of real estate agents and home
buyers.284 In light of this fact, the court reasoned that “[t]he
communications were not for the larger purpose of calling governmental
or public attention to any alleged contamination, or to influence the
government in its consideration or review of an environmental issue.” 285
The residents, therefore, were ineligible for immunity under the Act.286
Despite the limited contextual reach of Pennsylvania’s anti-SLAPP
statute, the Pennsylvania judiciary’s method of statutory construction
offers valuable instruction. Throughout the course of its analysis in
Penllyn Greene Associates. v. Clouser, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court elevated the constitutional significance of the right to petition.287
As a result, the court’s classification of statements as petitioning or non-

279. Id. at 430.
280. Id. at 434.
281. Id. at 433.
282. Id. at 430, 433.
283. Compare id. at 433 (holding courts must consider the nature of a statement, its
intended audience, and its purpose), with discussion supra Part IV (analyzing the SJC’s reliance
on the defendants’ subjectively stated intent in Cardno ChemRisk, LLC).
284. Penllyn Greene Assocs., 890 A.2d at 434.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. See, e.g., id. (“The Act was designed to protect those persons targeted by frivolous
lawsuits based on their constitutionally protected government petitioning activities.”).
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petitioning activity depended largely on the statement’s connection to
governmental redress.288 As the court explained:
The purpose of the Act is to encourage and open the lines of
communication to those government bodies clothed with the authority
to correct or enforce our environmental laws and regulations.
....
Accordingly, [the court] concludes that the immunity authorized
by the Act is restricted to those persons who petition the government
or make any statement reasonably likely to encourage consideration
or review of an environmental issue by a legislative, executive, or
judicial body or in any official proceeding in an effort to effect such
consideration.
Immunity is triggered if, and only if, the
communication is aimed at procuring favorable government action,
regardless of whether the communication is made directly to the
government or to third parties.289

As the court made clear in Penllyn Greene Associates. v. Clouser,
determinations regarding the aim of a communication cannot be reached
by evaluating a party’s subjective claim. Rather, an objective assessment
of the nature of the statement—which includes consideration of the
statement’s intended audience—is the most effective method to effectuate
the Act’s legislative intent.
CONCLUSION
For over twenty years, the Massachusetts judiciary has sought to
interpret and apply the anti-SLAPP statute in a manner consistent with its
text and legislative intent. Upon enactment, the “anti-SLAPP statute
broadly defined petitioning activities, defined a qualified immunity for
those activities, and crafted an objective test and an expedited procedure
for enforcing that immunity.”290 Judicial interpretations of the statute,
however, have extended the statute’s protections beyond the classic
SLAPP scenario.291 Nonetheless, the SJC has consistently effectuated the
288. Id. at 433–34.
289. Id.
290. See Yurko, supra note 160, at 36.
291. See Baker v. Parsons, 750 N.E.2d 953, 958 (Mass. 2001) (reviewing the statute’s
legislative history led the court to conclude that the statute was intended to go beyond the typical
case). There is mounting pressure—in Massachusetts and throughout the country—to further
expand the reach of anti-SLAPP protections. See, e.g., Katheleen Conti, TripAdvisor Wants
Tougher Law Protecting Online Reviewers from Suits, BOS. GLOBE (Sept. 28, 2017),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2017/09/28/tripadvisor-wants-tougher-state-lawprotecting-online-reviewers-from-lawsuits/ojcWjYVjprYiR5OPwXafRM/story.html
[https://perma.cc/M42P-PKU3] (discussing proposed legislation to extend anti-SLAPP
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statute’s legislative intent by focusing its inquiry on conduct.292 In
focusing on conduct, rather than a given defendant’s subjectively stated
intent, the court ensured that the right to petition was exercised—in the
constitutional sense—before extending the statute’s protections.
In Cardno ChemRisk, LLC v. Foytlin, however, the court shifted its
focus and highlighted the potential for judicial interpretation to obscure
the policy rationales underlying the anti-SLAPP statute.293 The court’s
conclusory analysis regarding the manner in which the blog post fit the
definition of the right to petition was largely based on the defendants’
subjectively stated intent to increase coverage of the oil spill’s
environmental consequences.294 As a result, the anti-SLAPP statute was
successfully invoked to immunize an opinionated blog—but was the right
to petition exercised in the constitutional sense of the phrase? In the
absence of an alternative interpretative framework—one that objectively
assesses a statement’s content, the manner in which it is issued, and its
proximity to government action—Massachusetts courts will risk
obscuring the critical importance of the connection between a statement
and public participation under the anti-SLAPP statute.
Interpretive methods undertaken in other jurisdictions offer insight
and instruction for future interpretation of the Massachusetts Anti-SLAPP
statute.295 Minnesota has highlighted the importance of examining the
nature of a statement, the purpose of statement, and the statement’s
intended audience.296 Similarly, the approach undertaken in Pennsylvania
demonstrates the importance of examining objective indicia of a
statement’s eligibility for protection as petitioning activity.297 Ultimately,
looking to the content of a statement, rather than a speaker’s subjectively
protections to forms of public speech, such as online reviews). Whereas the Massachusetts antiSLAPP statute does not address consumer reviews, other jurisdictions, such as the District of
Columbia, have included language in their anti-SLAPP legislation that expressly addresses the
issue. See D.C. CODE § 16-5501(3) (2018) (“‘Issue of public interest’ means an issue related
to . . . a good, product, or service in the market place.”). Not surprisingly, the “public concern
element” is at the crux of judicial debates surrounding anti-SLAPP statute’s applicability to
consumer reviews. See, e.g., Demetriades v. Yelp, Inc., 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 131, 143 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2014) (finding business reviews on Yelp’s website contain matters of public concern). See
generally Eric Goldman, Two More Cases Hold That Anti-SLAPP Laws Protect Consumer
Reviews, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Dec. 13, 2012), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/
archives/2012/12/two_more_cases.htm [https://perma.cc/6RJV-4MHU].
292. See N. Am. Expositions Co. v. Corcoran, 898 N.E.2d 831, 841 (Mass. 2009).
293. Cardno ChemRisk, LLC v. Foytlin, 68 N.E.3d 1180, 1187–88 (Mass. 2017).
294. Id. at 1189.
295. Freeman v. Swift, 776 N.W.2d 485 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009); Penllyn Greene Assocs.
v. Clouser, 890 A.2d 424 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005).
296. See Freeman, 776 N.W.2d at 490.
297. See Penllyn Greene Assocs., 890 A.2d at 434.
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stated intent, ensures that protection will be afforded to parties that
exercise the right to petition in the constitutional sense of the phrase.
Despite differences in statutory language, the approaches developed in
other jurisdictions could be adopted in Massachusetts in a manner that is
consistent with Massachusetts case law. The adoption of an objective
approach would provide consistent assessments of challenged statements
and will eliminate the need to inquire about subjective intent for purposes
of meeting the statutory definition. In the absence of such an approach,
the judiciary is bound to frustrate, rather than effectuate, the statute’s
legislative intent.

